Rethinking the response to coups in West Africa
ECOWAS should use its special summit on regional integration in 2025 to reconsider its approach to coup management.
Published on ISS Today on September 30, 2024
by
Aissatou Kante
West African Coastal Countries, ISS West Africa and Sahel Regional Office Researcher
Repeated coups since 2020 and decisions by Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger to withdraw from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) have revealed serious challenges to governance and democracy in the region.
ECOWAS’ struggles to deal with these crises, along with perceptions of double standards in the handling of military coups and “constitutional” coups carried out by elected governments, have tarnished the organization’s image in West Africa.
The decision of ECOWAS leaders to hold a special summit on the future of regional integration in West Africa in 2025 provides an opportunity to resolve these issues. The summit is inclusive and consultative and aims to strengthen ECOWAS and make it more efficient and responsive. West African leaders also called for a strategic review that included “the relationship between electoral processes, democracy and development.”
However, the summit should specifically consider how to better respond to coups, manage military transitions, and strengthen democratic governance. This includes renewed coups and prolonged returns to civilian rule in Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso, and Niger. The ability of military leaders to resist pressure from ECOWAS, the African Union (AU), the United Nations and bilateral actors should also be on the agenda.
Security cooperation in West Africa is fragmenting as violent extremism rises
Africa is currently facing a widespread crisis of multilateralism. In this context, a strategic review of ECOWAS should first take into account the regional characteristics that precipitated the recent coup d’état and called into question ECOWAS’ ability to respond effectively and support the transition. West Africa has three characteristics.
First, the popular support initially shown to the Pushists was an expression of popular dissatisfaction with the performance of the overthrown regime rather than giving them a clean slate.
Second, since 2012, ECOWAS and the AU have not responded effectively to terrorism, particularly in the Sahel region, and to the governance crisis caused by constitutional reform and the crisis of a controversial third term. There is no such thing. This situation limits the ability of both organizations to play a decisive role in current and future crises.
Third, the influence of Western partners is declining as geopolitical competition with Russia intensifies. Coupled with the military regime’s sovereignist stance, there is little room for outside actors to act in the region. Paradoxically, this is causing a fragmentation of political and security cooperation in West Africa at a time when violent extremism is on the rise in the Sahel and has spread to the Gulf of Guinea countries.
It is important for ECOWAS to make supplementary legislation on sanctions clearer and more predictable.
New Institute for Security Studies research shows that given the current consolidation of military regimes and the failure of regional and continental coup management approaches, realism is needed to stabilize affected countries . This includes improving certain ECOWAS regulations and institutional practices.
ECOWAS needs to refine its tools and procedures in dealing with coups, building on its experiences in Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea and Niger. Particularly after Niger’s overthrow in July 2023, regional organizations applied an unprecedented set of political, economic and financial sanctions and threatened military intervention.
None of these measures worked, but instead strengthened public support for the military. The creation of the Sahel Alliance and the withdrawal announcements of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger have fragmented ECOWAS and severely limited its deterrent capabilities.
To build support, it is important for ECOWAS to make supplementary legislation on sanctions clearer and more predictable. A clearly defined procedure for the use of force is also needed, along with a strategy for carrying out military operations while maintaining strategic and financial autonomy.
More broadly, ECOWAS Heads of State should resume efforts to revise the Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance. These were launched in 2015 after the overthrow of Burkina Faso’s Blaise Compaoré, and again in 2021 after a recent spate of coups. Member States proposed ways to strengthen democracy and governance, including giving ECOWAS additional tools to combat constitutional tampering and establishing standards for presidential term limits.
ECOWAS is widely perceived to care more about the interests of its leaders than the people of the region.
The timing of the proposal indicates ECOWAS’s tendency to respond to crises rather than prevent them. The lack of progress suggests that heads of state are more interested in protecting their own power than meeting public demands for greater oversight of governance. This largely explains West Africans’ disillusionment with ECOWAS, which is widely perceived as a “coalition of heads of state” that puts the interests of its leaders above the interests of the region’s people.
The political risks of ECOWAS reform are high. Addressing the goal of promoting and protecting democratic governance in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger is critical. However, these are precisely the states that are weakening ECOWAS’s position.
As we approach our 50th anniversary in 2025, ECOWAS continues to play a key role in regional integration and security cooperation. Becoming more efficient and reforming its ability to manage coups would improve the organization’s image in the eyes of West Africans. Above all, it will contribute to the stabilization of a region facing major political and security challenges.
You can read the full ISS report, “Rethinking the Response to Unconstitutional Regime Change in West Africa,” here.
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